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1. Summary 
This rapid literature review examines the main conflict and instability drivers in the Philippines. 
Key findings include: 
Conflict profile 
 Conflict has been a longstanding feature of the Philippines, with two long-running 
insurgencies, and a number of other types of conflict and violence. The current situation 
is complex and dynamic, with an “increasingly fragmented array of violent extremist 
organizations” (TNC, 2019).  
 In the current day the main types of violence and conflict include: violence by state actors 
against civilians; clan related violence; political and armed conflicts by 
nationalist/separatist groups in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago; a communist-
inspired guerrilla campaign (mainly in western Mindanao); violent extremist and criminal 
groups; anti-drug vigilantes; other criminal violence; domestic and gender-based 
violence; protests; violence around elections; and local conflicts over resources and 
community rights. 
 The Philippines is in the midst of a “human rights crisis” following President Duterte’s 
election in 2016 and the initiation of his war on drugs (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
2018).  
 More than 150,000 have been estimated to have been killed in conflicts in Central and 
Western Mindanao over the past five decades. 
 There have been at least three main peace agreements between the government and 
different insurgent groups over history, but none have delivered a sustainable peace yet.  
Conflict and instability – insurgent groups and drivers 
Insurgent groups  
 The Philippines has a long history of insurgent groups, three main armed insurgent 
groups are currently active, plus there are multiple violent extremist groups and factions. 
Militants move easily between violent extremism, insurgency and criminality. A number of 
groups align themselves to the so-called Islamic State (IS). Some see the new groups as 
representing a new strand of violent extremism, while others see them as having evolved 
from the previous struggles for secession and self-determination.  
Drivers of conflict in the southern Philippines 
A wide range of drivers and grievances are identified in the literature, however, importantly, ICG 
(2019) highlights that “generalisations can be misleading because motivations for participation in 
violence vary from place to place and individual to individual”. 
 Poverty, lack of opportunities, land dispossession and marginalisation - A key 
driver of violent extremism in Mindanao is longstanding historical grievances against the 
national government, this especially draws on feelings that the Muslim minority 
population has been marginalised by the dominant Christian population. There has been 
an acute sense of political and cultural alienation, and economic marginalisation. This 
draws on the reality that the Southwestern Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago are the 
poorest provinces in the Philippines, and one of Southeast Asia’s least developed 
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regions. The youth are particularly vulnerable to radicalisation, especially due to the rapid 
spread of social media. Land dispossession and loss of ancestral homelands of 
indigenous Muslims by Christian migrant settlers is also a core grievance.  
 State responses - The government’s response to violent extremism has been 
predominantly military, and hindered by a lack of coordination across government 
agencies (ICG, 2019; TSN, 2019). Key grievances are: the perception that the state 
military campaigns have been heavy-handed; protracted internal displacement following 
the battles and slow state reconstruction processes; human rights abuses by the military; 
and the sense of betrayal by the government during peace negotiations.  
 Lack of rule of law, governance weaknesses, clan politics and criminality - 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago’s remoteness and weak governance makes those 
regions the most vulnerable in the Philippines to violent extremism recruitment and 
training. Extortion of large commodity exporters and mining companies by insurgent 
groups is a proximate driver of conflict. 
 Religious education and leaders - Extremist preachers in the Philippines have played 
an important role in recruiting insurgents from Islamic education institutions, in forming 
and leading extremist cells, and in teaching extremist views. Transnational linkages 
amplify violent extremism through the movement and diffusion of ideas, funding, 
leadership, and tactical and technical knowledge. 
 The current peace process - The newly formed Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) significantly deepens and broadens political and cultural 
autonomy, though not as much as the peace agreement promised. It is widely recognised 
that rapid progress needs to be made on both the governance and normalisation tracks 
of the peace implementation plan, especially as insurgent groups are likely to seek to 
spoil the process.  
Drivers of instability across the country 
Political - The 2016 election of President Duterte saw respect for human rights and civil 
liberties deteriorate rapidly, with thousands of deaths through extra-judicial killings. 
Duterte’s authoritarian approach has increased the powers of the military and police, 
while human rights activists and critics have been targeted. The Philippines’ political 
settlement is dominated by entrenched, oligarchic family clans. 
 Socio-economic - The Philippines has one of the fastest growing economies in East and 
Southeast Asia, however, stark regional disparities mean that the GDP in the capital is 
five times that of Mindanao. The national poverty rate has declined over the past decade, 
however poverty remains high, and over 50% of the population in the Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao are poor. 
 Environmental - The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world 
with frequent and increasing natural disasters. Disasters lead to high costs to assets, 
wellbeing and capabilities. Changes in weather patterns may intensify the El Niño, with 
particularly severe consequences for the Philippines’ poor. 
There is a substantial amount of recent literature looking at the different issues that may drive 
conflict and instability in the Philippines. At the macro/country level, it is mostly from policy and 
practitioners. The literature tends to focus on: the recent violent extremist conflict acts ad actors; 
the peace process and the newly established Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (BARMM); and the human rights violations of Duterte’s war on drugs. The first two are 
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discussed together, and the literature does not tend to separate out the drivers for the conflict 
relating to the older insurgent groups and the newer pro-IS insurgent factions. The majority of 
literature focuses on the Mindanao region, while the human rights/war-on-drugs literature covers 
the country more broadly. 
2. Conflict profile  
Conflict has been a longstanding feature of the Philippines, with two long-running 
insurgencies, and a number of other types of conflict and violence that have fluctuated and 
changed over time. Post-independence (in 1946) The Philippines was relatively stable with 
steady economic growth (Asia Foundation, 2017). In the 1960s/1970s, violence and instability 
increased as a nationwide communist insurgency began, and Moros in the south Philippines 
launched an armed resistance (Asia Foundation, 2017). Authoritarian rule from 1972 to 1986, 
was replaced by democracy, yet “electoral fraud, corruption, and coup attempts continue to mar 
national politics” (Asia Foundation, 2017, p.3). 
The conflicts and actors are complex and dynamic, with an “increasingly fragmented 
array of violent extremist organizations” (TNC, 2019). Figure 1 presents ACLED data on the 
number of recorded conflict events by type of event in The Philippines from January 2016 until 
the current month (July 2019). In the current day the main types of violence and conflict are 
(ACLED, 2019; Timberman et al., 2019: 15; TSN, 2019: 6; Crost, Felter & Johnston, 2016; Asia 
Foundation, 2017):1 
 Violence by state actors against civilians (often as part of the war-on-drugs); 
 Clan related violence (rido or pagbanta);  
 Political and armed conflicts by a number of Moro nationalist/separatist groups in 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago;  
 A sporadic guerrilla campaign by the communist New People’s Army (mainly in western 
Mindanao); 
 Violent and illicit acts of other armed groups that combine terrorism, kidnapping, and ther 
so-called Islamic State (IS)-inspired extremism; 
 Violence by anti-drug vigilantes  
 Other violence by criminal organisations (sometimes called “Lawless Elements” (LE)) 
 Domestic and gender-based violence 
 Protests 
 Violence around elections 
 Local conflicts over resources and community rights 
 
 
                                                   
1 The Stabilisation Network (TSN) paper (2019: 5) is a Country Needs Assessment focussing on violent 
extremism, and responses to it, in the Philippines. It is based on primary sources, literature review and interviews 
with local officials and civil society leaders. 
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See: Figure 1: ACLED recorded conflict events by type (January 2016-July 2019). It 
presents conflict events from ACLED (2019a) based on its dataset - which is publicly available at 
https://www.acleddata.com/data/. ACLED tracks reported political violence from four main types of 
sources (ACLED, 2019b, p.33): (1) Local, regional, national and continental media reviewed on a 
daily basis; (2) Reports from NGOs or international organisations used to supplement media 
reporting; (3) Selected social media accounts, including Twitter and Telegram; and (4) 
Information and data provided through partnerships with local conflict observatories in hard-to-
access cases. The ACLED (2019b, p.6) codebook explains its methodology in further depth and 
that this data has its limitations – e.g. biases in the media coverage are not corrected for, and 
hard to reach areas are less covered. ACLED’s fundamental unit of observation is the “event”. 
‘Events involve designated actors – e.g. a named rebel group, a militia or state forces. They 
occur at a specific named location (identified by name and geographic coordinates) and on a 
specific day… ACLED currently codes for six types of events and twenty-five types of sub-
events, both violent and non-violent, that may occur during a period of political violence and 
disorder’ (ACLED, 2019b, p.6). The six types of events are: battles, explosions/remote violence, 
violence against civilians, protests, riots and strategic developments. 
 
The Philippines is in the midst of a “human rights crisis”, say Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), 2018), following President Duterte’s election in 2016 and the initiation of his war 
on drugs. This trend is demonstrated in Graphic 1, where ACLED collected data shows a 
dramatic increase in violence against civilians that occurred from June 2016, as state officials 
and anti-drug vigilantes targeted suspected drug users (ACLED, 2018). There is no reliable data, 
however the estimated death toll ranges from 6,600 (by the government) to 27,000 (by the 
Philippines’ Commission on Human Rights (CHR) (HRW, 2019).2 Amnesty (2018) highlights that 
“the deliberate, unlawful and widespread killings of thousands of alleged drug offenders 
appeared to be systematic, planned, organized and encouraged by the authorities, and may 
have constituted crimes against humanity”. The International Criminal Court (ICC) passed a 
resolution for a detailed report into it in mid-2019. 
More than 150,000 have been estimated to have been killed in conflicts in Central and 
Western Mindanao over the past five decades (the two Muslim-majority areas of the Southern 
Philippines) (Barron, Engvall & Morel, 2016). And conflict has affected over 60% of Mindanao’s 
cities and municipalities (World Bank, 2018; 2017). 
There have been at least three main peace agreements between the government and 
different insurgent groups but none have yet delivered a sustainable peace (TSN, 2019). In 
2014, the government and the Philippines’ largest rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF), signed the current peace agreement. 
Clan feuding (also known as rido) is increasing in Mindanao (Barron et al., 2016). Rido 
includes recurring violent retaliation over perceived affronts or injustices (Asia Foundation, 2017). 
“Factions can be historical (geographic, ethnic, linguistic, insurgent); rivalries are often due to 
personal, family, clan, or political feuds. Conflicts can erupt over land, marriage, elections, 
business deals, or personal grudges and often cut across and through families, clans, and 
                                                   
2 See CBN news article - https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/12/05/18/chr-chief-drug-war-deaths-could-be-as-high-
as-27000  
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insurgent groups” (Asia Foundation, 2017, p.150-151). Rido “tends to interact with separatist 
conflict and other forms of armed violence, especially when the conflicting parties are aligned 
with armed groups” (Asia Foundation, 2017, p.151). 
There was a “dramatic rise” in violent extremism in the Philippines, inspired in large part 
by IS with 2017 marking a high (TSN, 2019; International Alert, 2018). The 2017 violent takeover 
of Marawi city by pro-IS insurgents united fighters from Mindanao’s three largest ethnic groups, 
the Tausug, Maranao and Maguindanao (ICG, 2019). The five-month battle saw an increase in 
the number of deaths from extremism – with “more deaths per incident of violence in 2017 than 
at any time in the past seven years” (International Alert, 2018; ICG, 2019).  
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago are most vulnerable to violent extremism. While 
“beyond Mindanao, a low level of extremism affected the Philippines’ most populous island, 
Luzon” affecting Muslim and Balik Islam communities (the latter being Muslim converts from 
Christianity), and so too are the areas of Quezon City and Quiapo in the capital Manila (TSN, 
2019: 12). There is little reliable information on Luzon (TSN, 2019). 
Election-related violence is also a common feature in the Philippines – with the 2016 
elections “marred by significant electoral violence”, and more than the previous elections in 2013 
(Asia Foundation, 2017; BTI, 2018: 8). This is particularly so in rural areas governed more by 
clans, where vote buying and intimidation can occur (BTI, 2018). 
3. Conflict and instability – insurgent groups and drivers 
Insurgent groups 
In the Philippines, there is a long history of insurgent groups, and currently active are 
three main armed insurgent groups, plus multiple violent extremist groups and factions 
(most of which have splintered from the Moro nationalist movement in Muslim Mindanao) (TSN, 
2019: 7). Militants move between violent extremism, insurgency and criminality “seamlessly”, 
with numbers and factions of militants fluctuating (TSN, 2019: 7). A number of groups align 
themselves to IS. Information about the different groups are in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Non-state armed groups in the Philippines 
The MILF (established in 1977), is the largest armed group in Mindanao. “In recent years, 
the MILF has observed a ceasefire and positioned itself as a reliable partner in 
negotiations with Manila” (TSN, 2019: 7). During the 2017 siege of Marawi by IS-affiliated 
militants, “the MILF denounced IS and helped to establish a peace corridor for trapped 
civilians to escape the city” (TSN, 2019: 7). It has factions with “potentially disruptive 
elements” (TSN, 2019: 7). 
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) (founded in 1969), is a separatist armed 
group in Mindanao. The 1996 peace agreement it signed - to establish the Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) – failed, and it has now been eclipsed by the MILF. 
Now, the MNLF is now divided into two main factions” (TSN, 2019, p.8):  
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 The MNLF–Sema faction supports the peace agreement with Manila and the 
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), and it is 
represented on the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC). 
 The MNLF-Misuari faction has rejected the BARMM. The peace process is 
focusing on trying to include them in the process, to limit their role as a spoiler. 
The New People's Army (NPA) (established in 1969), is the armed wing of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). It was involved in peace talks until 2017 when 
President Duterte classified them as a terrorist organisation. It is active, and levies 
revolutionary taxes from businesses in Mindanao and northern Luzon. 
The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) (emerged in 2008) is a MILF splinter 
group. It wants full independence and rejects autonomous governance. It derailed the 
peace process in 2015 during the Mamasapano incident. It now has three main factions – 
two may be integrated into the demobilisation process, and the other has pledged 
allegiance to IS. 
The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)-Abu Turaifie faction (BIFF-
Turaifie) – “There are multiple shifting factions of fighters aligned to BIFF-Turaifie who 
maintain close kinship and social ties to MILF fighters… it is closely aligned to IS” and 
thought responsible for the 2018 attack on the South Seas Mall in Cotabato, which 
threatened to spoil the referendum to create the BARMM. 
The Maute Group (established in 2012) is a pro-IS “small clan-based armed force of 
mostly former MILF fighters”. They led the 2017 attack – by an alliance of pro-IS militants - 
on Marawi city. 
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (established in 1989) is a splinter group from the MNLF, 
and is “one of the most violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia and has one of the most 
developed networks with foreign violent extremists. Its agenda to establish an independent 
Islamic state, however, has been overshadowed by its ‘kidnap-for-ransom’ operations 
against Filipino and foreign nationals” (TSN, 2019: 9). It played a central role in the 2017 
Marawi city attack. “It has a capacity to operate across the Philippines-Malaysia-Indonesia 
border” (TSN, 2019: 9). 
The Abu Sayyaf Group-Basilan (emerged in the 1990s) is a splinter group from the Moro 
National Islamic Front, and is closely aligned with IS. Its previous leader led the 2017 
attack on Marawi City, and it is suspected responsible for a 2018 Lamitan bombing. It “is 
deeply embedded in local criminal networks” (TSN, 2019: 7). 
The Abu Sayyaf Group-Sulu is a MNLF splinter group, with shifting members – many are 
petty criminals. It is suspected to be responsible for the 2019 Jolo Cathedral bombing. 
Source: Text extracted and edited from TSN (2019, p.8-11) 
International Alert (2018) explain that there are two competing narratives to explain the current 
fragmentation of conflict actors:  
 The first narrative suggests that the Marawi conflict revealed the rise of a newly-emerging 
strand of violent extremism over the previous Moro nationalist rebellions; 
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 The second narrative suggests instead that many of the current actors evolved from 
previous struggles for secession and self-determination, and merely shifted their 
allegiance. 
One distinction is that the MNLF and MILF have kept their focus on local struggles for self-rule, 
and do not have global jihadist aspirations (ICG, 2019). 
Drivers of conflict in the southern Philippines 
A wide range of drivers and grievances are identified in the literature, however, importantly, ICG 
(2019) highlights that “generalisations can be misleading because motivations for participation in 
violence vary from place to place and individual to individual”. This section summarises the 
drivers most commonly discussed: 
Poverty, lack of opportunities, land dispossession and marginalisation  
A key driver of violent extremism in Mindanao is longstanding historical grievances 
against the national government, especially those of the minority Muslim population against 
the dominant Christian population (TSN, 2019). There has been an acute sense of political and 
cultural alienation among Muslims in Mindanao, and economic marginalisation (TSN, 2019).  
Southwestern Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago are the poorest provinces in the 
Philippines, and one of Southeast Asia’s least developed regions (Timberman, et al., 2019: 6; 
TSN, 2019). Poverty and economic marginalisation has been caused by “decades of national 
government neglect, poor regional and local governance, insufficient private sector investment, 
the self-interest of local political clans, ethnic and religious divisions, and the damaging effects of 
recurring conflict” (Timberman, et al., 2019: 6; TSN, 2019). Mindanao’s protracted conflict over 
forty years, combined with weak governance, and high levels of migration have limited its 
economic development and kept people in poverty (World Bank, 2018, p.7). “The same level of 
asset loss affects poor and marginalized people far more than their wealthier neighbors because 
their livelihoods depend on fewer assets and their consumption is closer to subsistence levels” 
(World Bank, 2018, p.7).  
Youth are particularly vulnerable to radicalisation, especially due to the rapid spread of social 
media - communication mediums that are less accessed by their parents (TSN, 2019, p.3). Some 
insurgent groups have paid insurgents (or their families) to recruit them or promised benefits to 
insurgents for carrying out attacks (TSN, 2019; ICG, 2019). However, ICG (2019) highlights that 
“generalisations can be misleading because motivations for participation in violence vary from 
place to place and individual to individual”. 
Land dispossession and loss of “ancestral homelands" of indigenous Muslims by 
Christian migrant settlers in Mindanao is a core grievance (TSN, 2019; Alim, 2019). It is 
framed as the “colonial and neo-colonial occupation of Mindanao” by the Spanish, Americans, 
Japanese and Philippines Republic which has resulted in: historical injustices, political 
disenfranchisement, economic marginalisation, social disintegration, and cultural alienation (Alim, 
2009, p.4). “Imperial Manila” is also blamed for sponsoring the Christians’ mass migration into 
Mindanao (TSN, 2019, p.14).  
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State responses 
The government’s response to violent extremism has been predominantly military, thus 
far, including extending martial law (ICG, 2019). The state’s overall response to violent 
extremism has been hindered by a lack of coordination, and thus disjointed responses, across 
government agencies (TSN, 2019: 2).  
The perceived heavy-handed military campaigns by the government is identified as a key 
grievance for insurgents. For example, the Armed Forces are viewed as having responded too 
aggressively to the 2017 IS-attacks on Marawi City, with many mosques, madrasas and schools 
also destroyed (TSN, 2019:15). Another example is the “all-out-war” declared on the insurgents 
who bombed the Jolo Cathedral in 2019, the armed forces’ response displaced an unknown 
number of citizens (TSN, 2019). 
Protracted internal displacement, following the battles, is a key grievance, where slow 
state reconstruction processes are blamed (TSN, 2019; ICG, 2019). E.g. in Marawi city 
between 66,000 (OCHA, 2019b) to 100,000 people (International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), 2019) are estimated to be displaced, two years following the siege. The displaced 
struggle to have access to clean water, permanent shelters, and viable livelihood opportunities 
(ICRC, 2019). While 46,000 people have been displaced since March in Maguindanao due to 
operations against remnants of the Bangasamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (OCHA, 2019b) 
Human rights abuses by the military also fuels violent extremism in Mindanao as a primary 
grievance narrative – mostly related to 1972-1968 abuses, some are more recent, and some that 
occurred around 2000 (TSN, 2019). Abuses include killings, bombings, and the enforcement of 
martial law by the military (TSN, 2019).  
The sense of “betrayals” by the government during peace negotiations, are also 
recognised as driving grievances (TSN, 2019). The sense of different identity also emerges 
from many Muslims in Mindanao feeling they are Moro (with Bangsamoro the idea of the Moro 
nation) rather than Filipino (BTI, 2018). 
Yet while in Mindanao grievances are strong against Manila, local government units 
(barangays) “are typically trusted by residents and their leaders are often actively involved in 
civil engagement”… thus “the recent creation of a new layer of governance, the Bangsamoro 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), could also provide opportunities to address 
these challenges on a local/regional level” (TSN, 2019: 2). 
Lack of rule of law, governance weaknesses, clan politics and criminality 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago’s remoteness contribute to their locations being the 
“most vulnerable to violent extremism” in the Philippines. This is because rule of law is weak 
and many areas are ungoverned spaces (TSN, 2019: 12). For example, the Maute Group recruit 
and train members in mainland Mindanao, as do the ASG in the Sulu Archipelago (see Figure 2 
for information about the groups) (TSN, 2019: 12). TSN (2019: 12) reports that ASG also has “a 
capability to operate in and mobilize resources from Sabah, in Eastern Malaysia”.  
The local politics preceding the Marawi crisis is not fully understood, but ICG (2019) notes 
that it “had a high level of violent crime and a reputation as the centre of Muslim Mindanao’s 
drug trade”. Former mayors were named as “narco-politicians (ICG, 2019). 
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Extortion of large commodity exporters and mining companies by insurgent groups is a 
proximate driver of conflict – it is e.g. thought to be the main source of finance for the NPA. 
The commodity exporters are vulnerable to extortion from the groups due to their remote 
locations in underdeveloped and under-governed spaces. Crost and Felter (2018) find evidence 
that is suggestive of a mechanism in which insurgent groups fund themselves by extorting 
commodity exporters, although they cannot show direct evidence due to the illicit and secret 
nature of extortion. 
Religious education and leaders 
Mindanao has a heterogeneous mix of religious communities (Christians, Muslims, and 
other indigenous groups) and is socially fluid (Timberman, et al., 2019). Muslims are indigenous 
to the Philippines, but today make up only 5-9% of the total population (Timberman, et al., 2019). 
“Although Muslim political leaders have long been involved in Philippine politics, Muslims have 
never unified to produce a broad-based political or social movement based on Islam” 
(Timberman, et al., 2019: 6). 
Extremist preachers in the Philippines have played an important role in recruiting 
insurgents from Islamic education institutions, in forming and leading extremist cells, and 
in teaching extremist views (TSN, 2019: 20). Daulah Islamiyah in their recruitment, offered 
opportunities to learn Islam, and stressed the importance of defending Islam and the community 
from enemies (ICG, 2019). Maute Group recruiters - often skilled preachers – “contrasted the 
purity of the proposed Islamic State with the appalling character of local politics” (ICG, 2019). 
Family and other personal ties often but not always play a role (ICG, 2019).  
Some educational institutions with radical preachers have links to, or are influenced by, 
Middle Eastern-trained scholars who condone violent extremism, while more moderate Islamic 
scholars (trained by the government) have been marginalised, finds TSN (2019: 19). Religious 
leaders are identified by TSN (2019) as important actors to engage with. 
Transnational linkages “are a key amplifier” of violent extremism in Mindanao through the 
movement and diffusion of ideas, funding, leadership, and tactical and technical 
knowledge (TSN, 2019: 22; ICG, 2019). The 2017 Marawi city attack was sponsored and funded 
by IS, and carried out under IS allegiance (TSN, 2019, p.22). The Philippines has a history of 
foreign fighters engaging in insurgency with the MNLF and MILF – e.g. from Indonesia, and 
Malaysia (ICG, 2019). 
The current peace process 
The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) was officially 
inaugurated in March 2019, following the peace agreement signed in 2014 (the 
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)), that was brokered over a decades-long 
peace process between the government and the MILF (Timberman, et al., 2019; ICG, 2019). The 
BARMM significantly deepens and broadens political and cultural autonomy (TSN, 2019: 7); It 
makes the region semi-autonomous, though not to the level of autonomy promised in the CAB 
(Timberman, et al., 2019: 8).   
The implementation of the CAB and the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) has two tracks 
(Timberman, et al., 2019: 7): 
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 A governance track - creating the BARMM and the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority 
(BTA) (an interim government until the 2022 elections);  
 A normalisation track – which decommissions and reintegrates the MILF/BIAF 
combatants, funds development projects in conflict-affected communities, and starts a 
transitional justice process.  
It is widely recognised that rapid progress needs to be made on both phases to keep the 
peace process on track (Timberman, 2019: 9). In particular, as potential perpetrators – violent 
extremist groups, MILF-splinter groups, and other armed groups – (may) seek to spoil the 
process (Timberman, 2019: 15). For example, the MNLF–Misuari faction are currently not signed 
up to the current peace process, and in this group (representing many ethnic Tausugs) some 
already see themselves as marginalised from the new BARMM by Maguindanons (TSN, 
2019:15).  
Key challenges facing the BTA are (Timberman, et al., 2019: 9): 
 “Building capacity to effectively govern and deliver public services and successfully 
normalising the situation in Mindanao and reintegrating former combatants.” 
 “Establishing a parliamentary system of governance, effectively exercising fiscal 
autonomy, managing relations with the central government and ensuring a meaningful 
role for representatives of all communities in Bangsamoro are also essential to the 
success of the BARMM”  
Also broader political and security dynamics challenge the process – e.g. Duterte government’s 
federalism initiative, the situation in Marawi, and the perceived threat of violent extremism  
(Timberman, 2019: 12). 
This sense of betrayal that insurgents feel towards Manila is also extended by some to the 
insurgent groups that have joined the peace process – e.g. the MILF’s current transition has 
made it the target of alienated youth and splinter groups (e.g. the Maute Group and the BIFF) 
who consider them to have betrayed the Moro cause (TSN, 2019). The MILF and the BARMM 
administration will need to deliver quickly on the peace agreement and new administration to 
keep insurgents and the public on board with the current process (TSN, 2019). Yet the 
challenges to the peace process are significant, thus it is likely that frustration and a sense of 
betrayal will increase as the new administration attempts to deliver on the peace process (TSN, 
2019).  
Drivers of instability across the country 
Political  
The 2016 election of President Duterte saw respect for human rights and civil liberties 
deteriorate rapidly, with his war on drugs and criminality leading to thousands of deaths through 
extra-judicial killings by police and vigilantes (BTI, 2018: 3). While the Philippines has signed up 
to human rights laws, and has institutions to implement them (e.g. a national human rights 
commission and human rights offices in the police and the military), these are flouted (Conde, 
2019b).  
Duterte’s authoritarian approach has increased the powers of the military and police, 
while human rights activists and critics have been targeted, harassed and silenced (Conde, 
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2019a; BTI, 2018). Impunity is widespread, under the banner of the drugs war, and Duterte has 
given law enforcement officers implicated in abuses assurances they will not be prosecuted 
(Conde, 2019b). Under the war-on-drugs campaign since 2016, “only one case - out of the 
official death toll of more than 6,600 and other estimates of 27,000 - has resulted in the criminal 
conviction of police officers” prosecuted (Conde, 2019b). Human rights activists, union workers 
and general critics are being targeted too under Duterte (e.g. Conde, 2018c).  
The Philippines’ political settlement is dominated by entrenched, oligarchic family clans 
(BTI, 2018). Duterte has initiated a series of significant structural reforms – e.g. introducing 
federalism and a parliamentary system of government, and changing the foreign policy 
orientation) (BTI, 2018). “The extent to which Duterte can challenge these structures of economic 
and political domination will determine the relative stability of his presidency” and whether his 
reform agenda is successful (BTI, 2018). With the exception of the radical groups in Mindanao, 
all other actors of importance accept democratic institutions (BTI, 2018). Duterte’s success in the 
mid-term elections in May 2019 are interpreted as him winning public approval for his 
controversial agenda (Reuters, 2019). 
Socio-economic  
Gross domestic product (GDP) rates of around 6% have made the Philippines’ one of the 
fastest growing economies in East and Southeast Asia (BTI, 2018: 3).3 “With increasing 
urbanization, a growing middle-income class, and a large and young population, the Philippines’ 
economic dynamism is rooted in strong consumer demand supported by vibrant labor market 
and robust remittances” (World Bank, 2019). “Cuts in interest rates and increased government 
spending have boosted economic confidence. Furthermore, a relatively stable banking sector 
and the reduction of foreign debts contributed to the overall positive macroeconomic 
development of the Philippines” (BTI, 2018: 3). However, stark regional disparities mean that the 
GDP in the capital is five times that of Mindanao (World Bank, 2018, p.8). 
The national poverty rate has declined over the past decade, however poverty remains 
high (with 22% under the national poverty line in 2018);4 and the pace of poverty reduction 
has been slow compared with other East Asian countries” (World Bank, 2018). Again, regional 
disparities are stark with two-fifths of the poor living in Mindanao; and over 50% of the population 
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao being poor (World Bank, 2018, p.8). There is a 
nexus between conflict and poverty (World Bank, 2017. p.2). The Philippines is the best for 
gender equality in the Asia-Pacific region, yet reported cases of violence against women have 
increased from 2006 to 2011 (Asia Foundation, 2017). 
                                                   
3 GDP was 6.2% in 2018 according to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), accessed 25 July 
2019. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tba
r=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=PHL  
4 Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population), World Bank, WDI, World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI), accessed 25 July 2019 
https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tba
r=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=PHL  
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Environmental 
The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world with frequent and 
increasing natural disasters including typhoons and earthquakes (World Bank, 2018). Since 
1990 natural disasters have caused an estimated US$23 billion in losses and damages; an 
estimated one million Filipinos are impoverished each year by natural disasters (World Bank, 
2018, p.7). “Where they occur, conflicts not only destroy physical assets, they also erode human 
capital through loss of life, injury, illness, denial of education and health services, and increased 
malnutrition. This reduces the earning ability and capabilities of the affected populations and 
traps people in poverty” (World Bank, 2018, p.7). 
Changes in weather patterns may intensify the El Niño, with particularly severe 
consequences for the Philippines’ poor. “The poorest regions of the country, where 
agriculture accounts for a disproportionate share of income and the capacity to manage risk is 
particularly weak, face increased vulnerability to shocks” (World Bank, 2018). The recent 
outbreak of dengue cases in the Philippines is also thought to have been exacerbated by the El 
Niño as drought and water shortages led people to collect water in containers and in mosquito 
breeding places (OCHA, 2019a). An El Niño-caused drought led to a demonstration by at least 
6,000 farmers in 2016 where they demanded government subsidies, the violent police response 
killed three, and left hundreds injured (Asia Foundation, 2017, p.151). 
“Both climate change and conflict significantly increase smallholder vulnerability, 
resulting in loss of livelihoods, financial assets, agricultural yield and the worsening of 
debt problems. Women and men are affected differently, resulting in changing farming patterns 
and coping strategies. Women are more disadvantaged and as such tend to farm in smaller 
plots, work shorter hours or limit farming to cash crops. Extreme climate events in conflict-prone 
agrarian communities appear to subject women to forced migration, increased discrimination, 
loss of customary rights to land, resource poverty and food insecurity” (Chandra, et al., 2017). 
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